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BLOOD FOR OIL: SECESSION, SELF-
DETERMINATION, AND SUPERPOWER SILENCE 
IN CABINDA 
INTRODUCTION 
Joseph1 spends his days huddled at a small desk in a rotting hotel in the 
Algerian district of Paris, writing fruitless missives to oil-drunken 
governments even after abandoning all hope for a response. He has been 
kidnapped several times and remains in hiding to avoid a more permanent 
fate. Joseph is a refugee of Cabinda, a tiny, suffering nation where the land 
holds a bubbling bounty kept just beyond the reach of its citizens—and 
where silence is worth its weight in oil. 
Cabinda is considered either a small coastal nation bordered by the 
Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or Angola’s eighteenth 
and northernmost province.2 It is approximately 7,283 square kilometers 
and has a population of about 300,000.3 When Angola gained its 
independence from Portugal in 1975, it incorporated Cabinda into its 
territory despite protests from Cabindan separatist guerillas.4 The guerillas 
opposing this incorporation founded the Front for the Liberation of the 
Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC).5 The conflict has lasted more than thirty 
years and has seen significant losses and human rights violations on both 
sides. All of this shows little sign of abating, despite promises of 
autonomy and further talks.6 Beneath the blood and turmoil, undisturbed 
by the bullets and the screams, flows the “black blood” of the industrial 
world, which has coaxed the Western powers into a soft sanction of the 
status quo. 
The uprising of Cabindan separatists throws into relief a much larger 
and more basic conflict. The right to self-determination is among the most 
fundamental concepts of international law, and is central to the U.N. 
 1. Joseph’s name has been changed to protect his refugee status. 
 2. Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, Cabinda, at http://www.unpo.org/ 
member.php?arg=13 (last visited Feb. 8, 2005); AD-HOC COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CABINDA, TERROR IN CABINDA: 1ST REPORT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN CABINDA 3 (Dec. 
10, 2002), available at http://www.cabinda.net/H.R.Report.Cabinda02.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2005) 
[hereinafter TERROR IN CABINDA]. 
 3. Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, supra note 2. 
 4. TERROR IN CABINDA, supra note 2, at 3. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. (detailing numerous human rights violations in the enclave of Cambinda during recent 
years). 
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Charter.7 This right guarantees all peoples freedom from colonial or other 
occupying influence and the freedom to determine their own destiny.8 On 
the other hand, a nation’s right to territorial integrity is inherent in the 
formation of nation states9—a right that prevents nations from splintering 
into powerless principalities.10 There are times, however, when the right of 
territorial integrity opposes the right of self-determination.11 This conflict 
between freedom and unity is at the heart of Africa’s struggle for peace, 
and Cabinda is on the front lines. 
This Note will address whether Cabinda’s right to self-determination 
supersedes Angola’s need to maintain its territorial integrity, and, if so, to 
what extent self-determination should be given to Cabinda. Part I offers 
some historical background on Cabinda and its relationship with Portugal 
and Angola. Part II examines the legal underpinnings of the rights of self-
determination and territorial integrity. Part III compares Cabinda to 
similarly-situated regions, including East Timor, Quebec, and Biafra. Part 
IV analyzes the legality of Cabinda’s secession or autonomy from Angola. 
This Note concludes that Cabinda’s right to self-determination supersedes 
Angola’s right to territorial integrity, and that the United Nations should 
take a central role in conducting a referendum on Cabinda’s independence. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Cabinda was part of the Kongo Kingdom when it was discovered by 
Portuguese explorer Diogo Cao in the fifteenth century.12 His friendship 
with the Kongo king gave rise to a trading relationship between the two 
countries.13 In the nineteenth century, Portugal signed three treaties with 
 7. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 (stating, “[t]he Purposes of the United Nations are: . . . [t]o 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples”). 
 8. See Pius L. Okoronkwo, Self-Determination and the Legality of Biafra’s Secession Under 
International Law, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 63, 73–74 (2002). 
 9. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (stating “[a]ll Members shall refrain . . . from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . .”). 
 10. Okoronkwo, supra note 8, at 79. 
 11. Id. at 107–08. 
 12. Cabinda: History—Scramble for Cabinda, WASH. POST ONLINE, at http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-adv/specialsales/spotlight/angola/article11.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2005) [hereinafter 
Scramble for Cabinda]. 
 13. Id. Cabinda was one of Portugal’s most important trading stations on the West African coast. 
This was principally a slave-trading enterprise. Id. By 1758, this relationship had grown so strong that 
King Mambuco Puna issued a royal decree granting Portugal exclusive trading rights in the area. The 
British and French had also established trading stations at the mouth of the Congo River in Cabinda by 
this time. Id. 
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the local people.14 The first two were with kingdoms south of the Congo 
River.15  
The Treaty of Simulambuco16 incorporated the previous two treaties 
and established Cabinda as a Portuguese protectorate.17 This was a key 
foothold for Portugal because it was their only territory north of the Congo 
River.18 In return for native support of Portuguese colonization, Portugal 
agreed to preserve the territorial integrity of individual regions and to 
maintain the language, culture, and customs of the indigenous peoples.19 
Meanwhile, Portugal was meeting with several other European states in 
Berlin to vivisect Africa into a fistful of private empires.20 The Berlin 
Conference of 1884–1885 recognized the Treaty of Simulambuco and 
established Angola and Cabinda as Portuguese protectorates.21
By 1956, Cabinda was administratively linked to Angola but remained 
“geographically, linguistically, and ethnically” distinct.22 A decade later, a 
massive oil reserve was discovered off the Cabindan coast.23 American 
and French oil corporations moved in and began pumping, giving oil 
revenues to Angola rather than Cabinda.24
Both Cabinda and Angola remained Portuguese protectorates and 
cooperated toward a common goal of independence from Portugal.25 In 
1963, the FLEC was created with the goal of gaining independence from 
 14. THE CABINDA NETWORK, History of Cabinda, at http://www.chez.com/cabinda/english/ 
history.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2005). The treaties were the Treaty of Tchifuma with the Kakongo 
Kingdom on September 29, 1883; the Treaty of Tchikamba with the Loango Kingdom on November 
26, 1884; and the Treaty of Simulambuco with the Ngoio Kingdom on February 1, 1885. Id. 
 15. Id. The Kakongo and Loango Kingdoms are part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
which runs along Cabinda’s southern and eastern borders. Website of the Republic of Cabinda, The 
Country of Cabinda, at http://www.cabinda.net/Cabinda02.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
 16. Treaty of Simulambuco, Feb. 1, 1885, Port-Cabinda, at http://www.cabinda.net/Cabinda1. 
html$tratado%20Simulambuco (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
 17. THE CABINDA NETWORK, supra note 14. The treaty of Simulambuco was signed in response 
to the Conference of Berlin. The Cabindans insisted that Portugal maintain Cabinda’s territorial 
integrity and maintain the authority of its regional chiefs. Scramble for Cabinda, supra note 12. 
 18. THE CABINDA NETWORK, supra note 14. Portugal’s historical stronghold north of the Congo 
was carved away by more powerful nations, such as Britain, Belgium, and France. Cabinda was the 
sole remaining Portugese territory north of the Congo, so Portugal was as eager to sign the Treaty of 
Simulambuco as were the Cabindans, albeit for different reasons. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Scramble for Cabinda, supra note 12. 
 21. See THE CABINDA NETWORK, supra note 14. Actually, only Angola had been considered a 
Portuguese colony because Cao discovered it. Cabinda was added as a protectorate only after the 
Treaty of Simulambuco. Id. 
 22. Scramble for Cabinda, supra note 12. 
 23. Swimming in Oil, WASH. POST ONLINE, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/ 
specialsales/spotlight/angola/article2.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2005). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Scramble for Cabinda, supra note 12. 
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Portugal, joining the existing Angolan Nationalist group, UNITA.26 A civil 
war resulted, lasting from 1961 to 1974.27 Meanwhile, the Organization 
for African Unity (OAU), which was responsible for outlining post-
colonial territorial boundaries, ranked Angola as the thirty-fifth state to be 
decolonized and Cabinda as the thirty-ninth, recognizing a clear 
distinction between the two.28
In 1971, Portugal drafted a new constitution that maintained the 
distinction between Angola and Cabinda.29 Soon thereafter, in 1974, the 
Portugese government fell, and its colonies took steps toward 
independence.30 In 1975, representatives of the Angolan Liberation 
Movement were invited to the southern Portuguese town of Alvor to 
negotiate that independence.31 However, no representatives of FLEC were 
present, and Cabinda, which had been an ally in the fight for freedom, was 
offered up as a spoil of war.32
Article 3 of the Alvor Accords33 legitimized the annexation of Cabinda 
as a province of Angola.34 At the time, Cabinda was producing nearly all 
of Angola’s oil, which accounted for close to half of the nation’s gross 
national product.35 Cabindans unilaterally rejected the Alvor Accords and 
declared their independence from Angola.36 In November 1975, Angolan 
 26. João Gomes Porto, Cabinda: Notes on a Soon to be Forgotten War, INST. FOR SECURITY 
STUD., Aug. 4, 2003, at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/iss-ang-4aug.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2005). 
 27. See ONWAR.COM, Armed Conflict Events Data: Angolan War of Independence 1961–1974, 
at http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/alpha/fangola1961.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2005). The Angolan 
war of independence resulted in an estimated 9,000 Portuguese casualties and some 30,000 insurgent 
deaths. Id. 
 28. Cabinda: Official Site of the Cabindese Government in Exile, History of the Cabinda, at 
http://www.cabinda.org/histoireang.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2005). In 2002, the Organization for 
African Unity was reorganized into the African Union, modeled loosely after the European Union. 
Henry Owuor, Building on the European Model: Challenges for the African Union, 49 WORLD PRESS 
REV. 10, 7 (July 24, 2002), available at http://www.worldpress.org/Africa/688.cfm (last visited Feb. 
28, 2005). Its purpose is to maintain the unity and independence of its fifty-three member states, which 
include Angola but not Cabinda. African Union: African Union in a Nutshell, at http://www.africa-
union.org/home/Welcome.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).  
 29. CABINDA NETWORK, supra note 14. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Porto, supra note 26, at 10. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Alvor Agreement on Angolan Independence, Jan. 15, 1975, Port.-Angl., art. 3 (on file with 
The Washington University Global Studies Law Review). 
 34. See THE CABINDA NETWORK, supra note 14. 
 35. Cabinda: Oil—Block Buster, WASH. POST ONLINE, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
adv/specialsales/spotlight/angola/article12.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2005). Cabinda is not as essential 
to Angola’s economy as it was in the 1960s and 1970s; Angola has since discovered significant oil 
fields off its own coast. Id. 
 36. CABINDA NETWORK, supra note 14. 
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troops, supported by Cuban and Soviet forces, occupied Cabinda and 
declared it Angola’s eighteenth province.37 In response, FLEC conducted 
an insurrection against Angolan troops, often attacking government 
soldiers with guerilla-style tactics, such as kidnapping oil company 
employees, in an attempt to heighten public awareness.38
Angola argues it simply wants to maintain its territorial integrity.39 The 
presence of oil casts doubt on Angola’s pure intentions, because Angola 
has little economic incentive to allow Cabinda’s secession.40 Cabinda’s 
wells supply over sixty percent of the oil revenues that account for forty-
two percent of Angola’s gross national product and ninety percent of the 
state budget.41 For many years Cabinda received none of these profits, and 
its citizens found themselves struggling to feed their families while living 
in sight of monstrous oil rigs.42
The situation is seeing moderate improvement. Ten percent of 
Cabindan oil revenues now go into the province’s coffers rather than 
Angola’s national fund.43 Some FLEC members engage in discussions 
with Angola regarding self-determination, although the process has not 
resulted in a peace agreement.44
During a visit to Washington, D.C. in February 2003, Angolan 
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos said that he supported a referendum on 
Cabindan autonomy.45 However, he stated he intended to consult the 
Angolan people as well, who likely will be loath to relinquish sixty 
percent of their nation’s oil revenues.46 FLEC said that it would only 
 37. Id. 
 38. Let the People Decide, WASH. POST ONLINE, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
adv/specialsales/spotlight/angola/article10.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2005). “FLEC split apart in the 
1980s, with the formation of FLEC-FAC and FLEC Renovada [FLEC-R], each pursuing different 
strategies on how to fight for independence.” Id. 
 In recent years, FLEC-FAC and FLEC-R have continued their kidnapping practices. See Porto, 
supra note 26, at 8. 
 39. See generally Elizabeth M. Jamilah Koné, The Right of Self-Determination in the Angolan 
Enclave of Cabinda, at http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Workshop/kone98.html (last visited Feb. 27, 
2005). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Cabinda: Oil—Block Buster, supra note 35. 
 42. Justin Pearce, Poverty and War in Cabinda, BBC NEWS, Oct. 27, 2002, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/2361143.stm (last visited Feb. 
8, 2005).  
 43. Let the People Decide, supra note 38. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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consider an East Timor-type referendum, which would grant Cabinda total 
independence.47
II. SELF-DETERMINATION VERSUS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY 
A dynamic conflict exists between a people’s right to self-
determination and a nation’s territorial integrity; a conflict between 
freedom and unity. 
A. The Right of Self-Determination 
Articles 1(2) and 55 of the U.N. Charter refer to the right of self-
determination.48 Part of the problem in implementing this right is that it 
lacks a commonly accepted definition.49 Many definitions of self-
determination include the following characteristics: (1) a government 
based on the will of the people; (2) freedom from internal and external 
dominance; (3) freedom to pursue economic, cultural, and social 
development; (4) the right to enjoy fundamental human rights; and (5) the 
absence of discrimination based on ethnicity or political beliefs.50 The 
International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) defines the right of self-
determination as an erga omnes right, meaning it applies to all people.51 
Self-determination has also been called an inalienable right.52 In extreme 
circumstances, the right of self-determination includes a right to secede.53
 47. Id. 
 48. Article 1(2) states that the purpose of the United Nations is to “develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and 
to take appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.” U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. Article 55 
states that relations are “based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination.” 
U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para 1. 
 49. Okoronkwo, supra note 8, at 73 (internal citations omitted). 
 50. Id. at 75. 
 51. Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30), at 102. “The principle 
of self-determination of peoples has been recognized by the United Nations Charter and in the 
jurisprudence of the Court . . . it is one of the essential principles of contemporary international law.” 
Id. The erga omnes character does not allow the International Court of Justice to act when there is an 
evaluation of lawfulness of conduct of a nation not a party to the case. Id. 
 52. Okoronkwo, supra note 8, at 75. 
 53. The special rapporteur of the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities further elucidated the definition: 
The principle of equal rights and self-determination, as laid down in the Charter of the United 
Nations, does not grant an unlimited right of secession to populations living in the territory of 
an independent sovereign state, and such a right cannot be regarded as a provision of lex lata. 
The right of secession unquestionably exists, however, in a special, but very important case: 
that of peoples, territories, and entities subjugated in violation of international law. In such 
cases, the peoples concerned have the right to regain their freedom and constitute themselves 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/16
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B. Right of Territorial Integrity 
Inherent in the organization of a country is the right to keep that 
country together. This right is also included in the Charter of the United 
Nations.54 Particularly in the infant nations of post-colonial Africa, 
countries have a keen interest in preserving their right of territorial 
integrity.55 There must be a balance, therefore, between the inalienable 
right of self-determination and the right to maintain a nation’s territorial 
integrity, because territorial integrity was not intended to preclude the 
right to self-determination.56 On one hand, too strict a reading of territorial 
integrity creates an internationally sanctioned form of fascism, a nation 
where the people have no freedom to disagree. On the other hand, too 
broad a definition of self-determination makes it impossible to keep 
countries together. Therefore, the threshold for secession based on self-
determination should be very high to avoid fractionalization based on 
minor divergences of interest. 
In U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 151457 and 1541,58 the right to 
self-determination was held to apply only in colonial situations.59 Later 
court decisions expanded this to apply to people who are oppressed by 
foreign occupying powers or otherwise denied the free exercise of self-
determination.60 Secession is only allowed in cases of gross human rights 
violations.61
independent Sovereign States. 
Okoronkwo, supra note 8, at 77–78 (citing Michael K. Addo, Political Self Determination Within the 
Context of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 32 J. AFR. L. 182, 191–92 (1988) 
(citing A. Cristeseu, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, The Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Development on 
the Basis of United Nations Instruments (1981), ¶ 173, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/sub/2/404/Rev.1)). 
 54. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . . .” Id. 
 55. Okoronkwo, supra note 8, at 79–80. 
 56. Id. at 80. 
 57. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 
1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) [hereinafter Resolution 
1514]. 
 58. Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 
1541 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 1, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961) [hereinafter 
Resolution 1541]. 
 59. See Okoronkwo, supra note 8, at 78–81 (analyzing Resolutions 1514 and 1541). 
 60. See Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30); Reference re 
Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
 61. Okoronkwo, supra note 8, at 106. 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
Several nations have seceded or attempted to secede from oppressive 
powers based on the doctrine of self-determination. East Timor, also a 
Portuguese colony, did so successfully as a non-self-governing territory in 
1960.62 Quebec attempted to secede from Canada several times, but in 
1998 the Canadian Supreme Court ruled against such secession.63 Biafra 
attempted and failed to secede from Nigeria during a bloody three-year 
civil war.64 The facts surrounding Cabinda’s claim to independence 
closely resemble some of the events in Biafra. While Biafra’s right to self-
determination was superseded by the old maxim of “might makes right,” 
Cabinda provides an opportunity to see how far diplomacy has progressed 
over four decades. 
A. East Timor 
The tiny island of Timor, situated to the southwest of Indonesia, has 
long been controlled by large colonial powers.65 Divided between the 
Dutch and the Portuguese during the colonial era, the western portion 
became part of Indonesia in 1946, while the eastern half remained under 
Portuguese control until 1975.66 Soon after East Timor’s first elections in 
1975, neighboring Indonesia orchestrated a coup d’état, resulting in a 
bloody civil war.67 Indonesia sent in military forces in December of the 
same year to occupy the region, proclaiming the area as Indonesia’s 
twenty-seventh province.68 The United Nations condemned the Indonesian 
invasion,69 but its pronouncements had little effect.70 By May 1976, 
 62. ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 224 (1995). 
 63. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 220–21. 
 64. Okoronkwo, supra note 8, at 110, 113. 
 65. CASSESE, supra note 62, at 224. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Barbara Cochrane Alexander, East Timor: Will There be Justice?, HUM. RTS. BRIEF (Fall 
2000), at 5. The Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (Fretilin), predictably, 
demanded total independence, while the Anti-Communist Movement (MAC) advocated integration 
with Indonesia. CASSESE, supra note 62, at 224. 
 68. Alexander, supra note 67, at 5. 
 69. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 53, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.N.Y.B. 754; 
Timor: Consideration by the Security Council, 1976 U.N.Y.B. 752; The Question of East Timor, 1977 
U.N.Y.B. 263; Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1977 
U.N.Y.B. 828, 867; G.A. Res. 34, U.N. GAOR 4th Comm., 32d Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1977 
U.N.Y.B. 890 (reaffirming the people of East Timor’s right to self-determination by a vote of 67 to 
26); Trusteeship and Decolonization: Other Colonial Territories: East Timor Question, 1981 
U.N.Y.B. 1095, 1182; G.A. Res. 50, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess. (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.N.Y.B. 1185 
(reaffirming “the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and 
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Indonesia had installed a puppet “Regional Popular Assembly” that passed 
a resolution in favor of East Timor’s incorporation into Indonesia.71  
Indonesia maintained that the people of East Timor had exercised their 
right to self-determination through the Regional Popular Assembly.72 On 
the other hand, Portugal, recognized by the United Nations as the 
administering power in the region, maintained that the approval of East 
Timor’s integration with Indonesia had not been an accurate representation 
of the “free and genuine will” of the people.73 The conflict between 
Portugal’s claim to administrative control in East Timor and Indonesia’s 
de facto control of the region came to a head in 1989 with a natural 
resource contract disagreement, referred to as the Timor Gap Dispute.74 
The International Court of Justice ruled in 1995 that the Court could not 
determine Indonesia’s treaty-making power over East Timor or the 
lawfulness of Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor because it lacked 
jurisdiction over Indonesia.75
In 1999, the U.N. Security Council brokered a deal with Portugal and 
Indonesia to allow the people of East Timor to vote on a special autonomy 
independence” by a vote of 54–42–46). 
 70. CASSESE, supra note 62, at 224. 
 71. Id. In response, the Indonesian legislature enacted Law 7/76, which officially made East 
Timor the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia. Id. 
 72. Id. at 225. Lest Indonesia’s argument appear smug in the face of history, it was not the only 
nation to espouse such a view. In a 1978 U.N. General Assembly meeting, the representative of 
Malaysia stated: 
The people of East Timor had on previous occasions expressed and even documented their 
genuine desire to attain independence through integration with Indonesia. In accepting their 
request the Malaysian Government is satisfied that the government of Indonesia had gone to 
the extremes to [sic] carefully make sure that the request was in accordance with [the] wishes 
of the people, for we are convinced they would not have acceded to it were it against their 
wishes . . . It remains our position that the people of East Timor have already exercised their 
right of self-determination through the legitimate People’s Assembly. 
Id. at 226 n.30 (quoting Press Release of the Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the UN, New York, 
1978, 2–3, 4.). 
 73. CASSESE, supra note 62, at 225. 
 74. Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30), at 102 [hereinafter 
East Timor Case]. See Julie Sforza, The Timor Gap Dispute: The Validity of the Timor Gap Treaty, 
Self Determination, and Decolonization, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 481, 484 (1999). 
Portugal instituted proceedings in the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) in 1991 against 
Australia seeking a declaration from the Court that Portugal's status with respect to East 
Timor and the rights of the people of East Timor to self-determination, territorial integrity and 
unity, and permanent sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources opposed Australia's 
treaty on the Timor Gap. 
Id. at 485. 
 75. East Timor Case, 1995 I.C.J. at 102. The I.C.J. thus determined it did not have jurisdiction 
over the matter. The same dilemma had crippled the U.N. for so many years, as any action regarding 
East Timor in its present state would constitute a tacit acceptance of the de facto controlling power. Id. 
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within the Republic of Indonesia.76 If the people of East Timor rejected 
this special autonomy, the alternative was total independence.77 Registered 
voters voted overwhelmingly to transition toward independence.78
Under the watchful eye of the U.N., East Timor is now tottering toward 
independence.79 East Timor is an excellent example of a U.N.-led 
referendum leading to an expression of the self-determination of the 
people. 
B. Quebec 
One of Canada’s ten provinces, Quebec has a population of about six 
and a half million people, eighty percent of whom are French speakers.80 
In the 1960s, Quebec began to assert itself as an industrial power and 
consequently demanded greater influence in the economic and commercial 
decisions of the province.81 They also attempted to gain a more 
widespread use of the French language.82  
In 1980, the majority of Quebec’s citizens voted, against secession 
from Canada.83 Despite this setback, Quebec continued to push for 
independence. In 1988, the Canadian House of Commons ratified the 
 76. Alexander, supra note 67, at 5. This deal between Indonesia and Portugal is often referred to 
as the May 5 Agreement. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. On September 3, 1999, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that 78.5 percent 
of the East Timorese population had voted to reject Indonesia’s offer of special autonomy, choosing 
rather to transition toward complete independence. Id. In the months leading up to the vote, pro-
integration militia, supported by Indonesian military, had intimidated and terrorized the East Timorese 
population in an effort to sway their vote and keep the region under Indonesian control. Id. Violence 
escalated sharply in the month following the outcome of the vote, resulting in systematic mass murder, 
forcible displacement of East Timorese citizens, sexual assault of women, and destruction of seventy 
percent of the country’s public and private property. Id. 
 79. The nation is now attempting to build a viable economy and prosecute the guilty parties for 
these atrocities. Id. As of late 2000, they had not been prosecuted, mainly because Indonesia did not 
have the legal capacity or will to do so. Id. 
 80. CASSESE, supra note 62, at 248. In a nation that still considers itself a subject of the British 
throne, Quebec is an anomaly. It was originally settled by the French in 1608, but was conquered by 
British troops in 1759 during the French and Indian War. Id. The 1763 Treaty of Paris, which ended 
the Seven Years War in Europe, transferred sovereignty of Quebec from France to Great Britain. 
When Britain created Canada as a state a hundred years later, Quebec was included. Id. 
 81. Id. This was termed the “Quiet Revolution” and was initiated by the French-speaking middle 
class in an attempt to gain a greater representation of Francophone interests. Id. 
 82. Id. This resulted in the passage of Bill 22 in 1974, making French the official language of the 
province. Two years later, the separatist Parti Québecois won control of the province’s legislative 
body on the platform of a public referendum on secession. Id. 
 83. Id. at 248–49. The concern among many of the citizens voting against secession was that 
separation from Canada would sacrifice their economic prosperity. Id. at 249. 
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Meech Lake Accord, which granted several key powers to Quebec.84 
However, the Accord failed to obtain ratification by all ten provinces and 
eventually broke down.85 Quebec continued to push for secession, pushing 
through nationwide referenda in 1992 and 1995, but both times the vote 
was against sovereignty. Indeed, even the citizens of Quebec voted in the 
negative.86  
In 1998, the Quebec government asked the Supreme Court of Canada 
whether Quebec could secede under Canada’s Constitution or under 
international law principles of self-determination.87 The court ruled against 
Quebec’s constitutional argument because its own citizens had voted 
against secession several times.88 In reply to Quebec’s second contention, 
 84. Id. In 1987, the Quebec government announced it would agree to adhere to the Constitutional 
Act of 1982 if the Canadian government met the following five conditions: 
(1) explicit constitutional recognition of Quebec as a distinct society; (2) the constitutional 
guarantee of broader powers in the field of immigration; (3) the limitation of federal spending 
power with respect to programmes falling under Quebec’s exclusive jurisdiction; (4) changes 
in the constitutional amendment procedure enshrined in the [Constitution Act of 1982]; (5) 
Quebec’s participation in appointing judges from Quebec to sit in the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
Id. (citing Report of the Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, Quebec, 
March 1991, 31–32). 
 85. Id. at 249. When the amendments were offered for ratification, Manitoba and New 
Brunswick refused to ratify them on the grounds that they failed to protect Quebec’s English-speaking 
minority and Newfoundland retracted its ratification based on a concern that the Premier of Quebec 
had essentially ignored a Canadian Supreme Court decision prohibiting French-only signs. Id. 
 86. Perspective and History of Quebec Nationalism, UNI.CA, at http://www.uni.ca/history.html 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2004). The 1992 referendum was defeated fifty-four percent to forty-six percent. 
The second referendum, in 1995, was defeated fifty-one percent to forty-nine percent. Id. 
 87. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 218. The first question was whether 
under the Constitution of Canada, the National Assembly, legislature, or government of Quebec could 
secede from Canada unilaterally. The second question was whether international law gives the 
National Assembly, legislature, or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec 
from Canada unilaterally, and whether there is a right to self-determination under international law that 
would give the right to effect secession unilaterally. The final question was, in the event of a conflict 
between domestic and international law regarding the right to secede, unilaterally whether the National 
Assembly, legislature, or government of Quebec take precedence in Canada. Id.
 88. Id. at 220–21. 
A clear majority vote in Quebec on a clear question in favour of secession would confer 
democratic legitimacy on the secession initiative which all of the other participants in 
Confederation would have to recognize . . . Quebec could not, despite a clear referendum 
result, purport to invoke a right of self-determination to dictate the terms of a proposed 
secession to other parties to the federation. [Such a vote could not override] the principles of 
federalism and the rule of law, rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of 
democracy in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole . . . . Negotiations would need to 
address the interests of the other provinces, the federal government and Quebec and indeed 
the rights of all Canadians within and outside Quebec, and specifically the rights of 
minorities. The negotiation process would require the reconciliation of various rights and 
obligations by negotiation between two legitimate majorities, namely, the majority of the 
population of Quebec, and that of Canada as a whole. 
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secession on the basis of international law, the court enumerated three 
situations in which international law would uphold a nation’s right to 
“external self-determination” or secession: former colonies; situations of 
oppression, for example a people suffering foreign military occupation; or 
where a definable group is denied meaningful government access to 
pursue political, economic, social and cultural development.89
The court then determined that according to this understanding of 
international law, “Quebec does not meet the threshold of a colonial 
people or oppressed people, nor can it be suggested that Quebecers have 
been denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, 
economic, cultural and social development.”90
Although frequently defeated, Quebec continues to fight for secession. 
The vocal secessionist minority still exercises significant influence over 
the Premier of Quebec and still holds considerable sway over the 
population as a whole, though not enough to pass a referendum.91 There is 
a distinct possibility that this cycle will repeat several more times. As 
such, Quebec is a good illustration of the limits of the right of self-
determination. Additional lessons may be learned from the Canadian 
Supreme Court’s opinion, which clearly outlines the elements required for 
secession. 
C. Biafra 
In 1914, when British colonial administrators introduced a plan to 
amalgamate the Northern and Southern protectorates of the Niger region, 
the plan was decidedly unpopular.92 The Northern protectorate, though still 
a colony, gave serious consideration to the idea of secession.93 Britain, 
Id. 
 89. Id. 
The right to secession arises only under the principle of self-determination of people at 
international law where “a people” is governed as part of a colonial empire; where “a people” 
is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly where “a people” is 
denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it 
forms a part . . . A state whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples 
resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without discrimination, and respects the 
principles of self-determination in its internal arrangements, is entitled to maintain its 
territorial integrity under international law and to have that territorial integrity recognized by 
other states. 
Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. CASSESE, supra note 62, at 250–51. 
 92. Okoronkwo, supra note 8, at 63, 65. 
 93. LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 164 (1978). 
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however, continued with the plan, joining the North and South to form a 
nation that the Prime Minister of Nigeria, Abubakar Tatawa Balewa, 
described as “existing as one country only on paper.”94 Within these new 
borders were three distinct and often hostile ethnic groups: the Hausa-
Fulani in the Northern region of the country, the Yoruba in the Western 
region, and the Ibo in the Eastern region.95 The regions were separated by 
differences in language, culture, religion, and economic development, 
which only amplified the animosity between them.96 By the time Nigeria 
gained its independence from Britain in 1960, the three main tribes were 
threatening secession as the “trump card” in a jealous, irrational, and often 
bloody battle for control.97
Even before Nigeria became independent, the tentative stalemate was 
often inflamed by the perceived advancement of any side.98 Unfortunately, 
independence did not quell the rising tide of animosity and suspicion. 
Instead, with no controlling outside power, the neighboring regions grew 
more jealous of one another.99 Tensions also increased due to difficulties 
suffered by the newly-liberated federation in agreeing on representation.100
On January 16, 1966, several young Ibo military officers staged a coup 
and installed Major General Aguiyi Ironsi as head of state.101 Of course, 
 94. See Okoronkwo, supra note 8, at 66. 
 95. BUCHHEIT, supra note 93, at 162. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 164. See also Okoronkwo, supra note 8, at 66. Obafemi Awolowo, former Premier of 
West Nigeria, stated: 
Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no “Nigerians” in the 
same sense as there are “English,” “Welsh,” or “French.” The word “Nigerian” is merely a 
distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from 
those who do not. 
Id. 
 98. Id. at 66–71. At the 1950 Ibadan Constitutional Conference, the Northern delegates 
threatened to secede unless the North received control of fifty percent of the seats in the country’s 
central Legislature. Three years later, the North again threatened to secede, following a debate about 
self-government in the House of Representatives. Subsequently, the West threatened to secede over the 
issue of whether the capital city of Lagos should be considered a “no-man’s land” belonging to none of 
the regions, or remain an integral part of the Western region, as it always had been. Id. at 66–67. 
 99. Id. at 66–71. In 1962, following the rise of an unpopular Western candidate to the rank of 
Premier, the North declared a state of emergency and reclaimed control of the government, fueling the 
flame of Western resentment. When the national census came out a year later, the East accused the 
North of artificially inflating its population, sparking a volley of accusations from every region. Id. at 
67–68. 
 100. Id. at 68–69. The 1964 federal election was marred by vote-rigging, kidnapping, and murder, 
resulting in the Southern parties boycotting the election and the East openly expressing its desire to 
secede. The next year, the Northern-dominated central government manipulated the Western regional 
election and installed a puppet government, enraging the Western electorate and sparking a riot that 
plunged the nation into chaos. Id. 
 101. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p701 Lyle book pages.doc 11/8/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
714 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4:701 
 
 
 
 
 
 
this triggered jealousy and paranoia in the North and the West, leading to a 
second coup on July 29, the assassination of Major General Ironsi, and the 
installation of Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a Northerner.102  
This Northern paranoia finally boiled over in September and October 
of 1966, leading to the murder of at least 10,000 Ibos and the expulsion of 
many more.103 As violence in the North escalated, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Gowon feebly attempted to pacify the aggrieved East and to reconstruct 
the tattered nation.104
The United Nations refused to intervene, claiming the incident was 
under the jurisdiction of the Organization for African Unity—who also 
refused responsibility—arguing it was an “‘internal affair,’ the solution of 
which was primarily the responsibility of the Nigerians themselves.”105 
Because the international community refused to become involved, several 
nations took advantage through arms profiteering by offering weapons and 
allegiances to the highest bidder.106
The Eastern region’s declaration of secession from Nigeria in 1967, 
creating the independent nation of Biafra, hardly came as a surprise.107 
Lieutenant-Colonel Gowon’s government responded by declaring war on 
Biafra, resulting in a bloody civil war.108 Despite defeat to Nigeria, 
Biafra’s claim to self-determination and secession seems valid. The Ibo 
people attempted to exercise their right to self-determination by seceding 
from Nigeria, which decision was authorized by the only two functioning 
political bodies in the Eastern region, the Consultative Assembly and the 
Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders.109
The Biafrans were justified in their belief that secession was a valid 
method of self-determination because all the regions, the North in 
particular, had frequently used such threats to alter their relationships with 
 102. BUCHHEIT, supra note 93, at 165. 
 103. Id. at 166. 
 104. Id. at 166–67. 
 105. Id. at 169. The United Nations claimed that no member state had brought the issue before the 
General Assembly, although the unspoken assumption was that the Assembly would simply refuse to 
discuss it if mentioned. Id. 
 106. Id. at 170–71. France was reported to have supplied the Biafrans with arms indirectly through 
the Ivory Coast and Gabon. Portugal allowed the Biafrans to use Lisbon as a base for propaganda and 
purchasing arms. On the other hand, Britain, as the former colonial power, retained its attachment with 
the federal government and provided weapons, justifying their actions as diplomatic. Id. 
 107. Id. at 167–68. 
 108. Id. at 168. 
 109. Id. at 173. A joint session of these bodies produced a resolution mandating Lieutenant-
Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, commander of the Eastern region, “to declare at the earliest practicable 
date Eastern Nigeria a free, sovereign and independent state by the name and title of the Republic of 
Biafra.” Id. See also Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra, May 30, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 665, 678–79. 
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others and influence important decisions.110 In addition, the Biafrans had a 
legitimate claim to oppression after the Northerners killed fifty thousand 
of their citizens and drove two million from their homes.111 Biafra also had 
historical distinction, as its members had a different culture, language, and 
religion from the rest of the nation, and historically had been separate 
before colonization.112
Unfortunately, Biafra illustrates what happens when law fails: societies 
revert to trial by combat.113 In a world where authority is derived from 
physical power rather than democratic processes, Biafra deserves to be 
free, but does not have the military strength to secede. Biafra exemplifies 
the ugly alternative to referenda and diplomacy—where justice falls victim 
to power. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Angola’s Arguments against Secession 
Angola makes three arguments in favor of unifying Angola and 
Cabinda. First, Angola makes an historical argument, citing the 1956 
Alvor Accords linking Cabinda administratively with Angola.114 Angola’s 
second argument is that Cabinda is neither a colony nor under foreign 
military occupation according to the guidelines set by the Canadian 
Supreme Court decision.115 Cabindans, according to Angola, cannot be 
considered a people because they do not significantly differ from 
Angolans, nor are they sufficiently united among themselves.116 Angola 
further argues that Cabindans have a meaningful voice in their own 
government. In fact, several Cabindans have held high positions in 
Angola’s government.117 Angola’s third argument against Cabindan 
 110. BUCHHEIT, supra note 93, at 173–74. 
 111. Id. at 174. 
 112. Id. at 162. 
 113. Arising in the wake of the Norman Conquest as a purportedly viable judicial tool, trial by 
combat engaged the plaintiff and the defendant in combat “on the theory that God’s intervention would 
give victory to the side of justice.” John A. Makdisi, The Islamic Origins of the Common Law, 77 N.C. 
L. REV. 1635, 1659 (1999). 
 114. See supra note 20. Article 3 of the Alvor Accords stated that “Angola forms one indivisible 
unit, within its present geographical and political boundaries, and in this context Cabinda is an 
unalienable component part of Angolan territory.” Alvor Accords, supra note 33, art. 3. 
 115. Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. See supra note 60, § III.C. 
 116. See CABINDA NETWORK, supra note 14. There is some evidence that Angola is now 
beginning to import families into Cabinda to legitimize this claim. This attempt to breed out the 
differences between Angola and Cabinda further illustrates the existence of differences between the 
two. See Porto, supra note 26. 
 117. Scramble for Cabinda, supra note 12. For example, Cabindans have served as Angola’s 
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secession is that Cabinda is an essential part of Angola’s economy, 
without which Angola would be left destitute. At present, Cabinda is the 
richest province in Angola.118
B. Cabinda’s Arguments for Secession 
Cabinda’s first argument in favor of secession is based on its historical 
claims to independence. Aside from the Alvor Accords, Cabinda was 
widely recognized as distinct from Angola.119 Although Cabinda was 
annexed to Angola at the Alvor Accords, Cabinda was not invited to the 
Accords and therefore had no power to prevent this annexation.120
Cabinda bases its legal claims for independence on the right of self-
determination as defined by the Canadian Supreme Court, which only 
allowed secession in cases of colonial occupation, foreign domination or 
exploitation, and “possibly where ‘a people’ is denied any meaningful 
exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it forms 
a part.”121 The Angolan occupation subjects Cabinda to alien subjugation 
and domination.122 Major oil exportation and huge profits for Angola leave 
little doubt that Angola is exploiting Cabinda.123 In addition, numerous 
human rights abuses in the area range from unlawful detention and torture, 
to gang rape and murder.124 As a result, Cabinda is entitled to a 
referendum on self-determination, and the United Nations is the only 
organization in a cognizable position to intervene.125
interior minister, defense minister, and as Angolan ambassadors in Great Britain and Canada. Id. 
 118. Cabinda: Oil-Block Buster, supra note 35. 
 119. In 1885, the Treaty of Simulambuco established Cabinda as a Portuguese protectorate; in 
exchange, Portugal promised to maintain Cabinda’s territorial boundaries and preserve its language, 
culture, and customs. In 1963, the Organization for African Unity recognized the distinction between 
Cabinda and Angola by ranking them as two separate states remaining to be decolonized. The 1971 
Portuguese Constitution maintained a similar distinction. See CABINDA NETWORK, supra note 14.  
 120. Id. The Angolan government has rejected the Alvor Accords on several occasions, preventing 
any recourse to that line of argument. See Timothy Bancroft-Hinchey, Heir to Portuguese Throne 
Explains Case for Cabinda Independence, PRAVDA.RU (Russian online news service), Mar. 26, 2001, 
at http://english.pravda.ru/portugal/2001/03/26/3156.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2005). 
 121. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 222. 
 122. Porto, supra note 26. 
 123. For more than twenty-five years, all profits from oil extracted from Cabinda went directly to 
Angola’s coffers. In an attempt to quell the uprising, Angola now returns ten percent of oil profits 
directly to Cabinda. See Let the People Decide, supra note 38. 
 124. AD-HOC COMMISSION FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN CABINDA, supra note 2, at 9. 
The report details numerous instances of rape, torture, murder, and unlawful detention, offering 
specific proof for the claim of human rights abuses in Cabinda. 
 125. To this point, the United Nations has not discussed Cabinda’s claims to self-determination. 
However, human rights abuses arising from the conflict with Angola have gained the attention of the 
U.N. Commission on Human Rights. In fact, at its March 2003 Conference in Geneva, a representative 
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C. Application of Case Studies to Cabinda 
Like East Timor, Cabinda is a former Portuguese colony.126 Both 
nations were occupied by foreign forces following their independence. 
However, while Indonesia had no military connection with East Timor, 
Cabinda was occupied by its ally, Angola. The resolution of the East 
Timor case, a referendum sponsored by the United Nations, would be a 
hopeful end to the Cabindan conflict as well. 
Quebec, despite its linguistic difference from the rest of Canada, did 
not meet the criteria for secession because secession was not the will of 
Quebec’s citizens.127 As in East Timor, the people of Quebec had several 
opportunities to vote in referenda; each time they voted against secession. 
Again, such a vote in Cabinda would be a logical resolution to the conflict 
with Angola. The case of Quebec also illustrates that self-determination 
has limits, and not every people will choose to secede under its auspices. 
Biafra is an unfortunate example of Cabinda’s fate if such a 
referendum does not occur. Angola, like Nigeria, has superior military 
power versus the Cabindian armies and can exert its will over the 
Cabindan people by brute force. However, to allow power to determine 
influence is to ignore everything the United Nations was created to 
protect. 
CONCLUSION 
Cabinda’s secession from Angola is legitimate based on its geographic, 
cultural, and linguistic distinctiveness; its historical autonomy; the 
international body of law supporting self-determination; and the numerous 
and well-documented human rights violations inflicted on Cabindan 
citizens. Despite the fact that such secession will damage Angola’s 
economy, the people of Cabinda have a right to profit from their own 
natural resources and to determine their own destiny. 
As a result, the Cabindan people should, like the East Timorese and the 
Quebecois, have the opportunity to determine whether to remain a part of 
of FLEC was invited to address the committee on Cabinda’s claims to autonomy. See Press Release, 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Foreign Minister of France to Commission on Human Rights: The 
World is Living Dramatic Events with the Iraq Crisis (Mar. 24, 2003), at http://www.wnhchr.ch/ 
huricane/hurican.nsf/0/6352D43E27F429E3C1256CF3005A44B2?opendocument (last visited Apr. 14, 
2005).  
 126. See History of Cabinda, supra note 14; CAGESSE, supra note 62, at 224. 
 127. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. In contrast to Quebec, all indications show that the 
people of Cabinda overwhelmingly (and almost unanimously) support a referendum on independence. 
See TERROR IN CABINDA, supra note 2, at 3. 
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Angola or become a separate nation. For this referendum to become 
reality, however, the United Nations must take action. The United Nations 
must take an active role in this referendum to ensure that the vote is an 
accurate expression of the will of the Cabindan people. The Cabindan 
people have a right to self-determination, and at present, that right is 
overshadowed by Angola’s financial gain. For the United Nations to 
remain relevant in the twenty-first century, it must fulfill its mission by 
guaranteeing choices to oppressed peoples struggling for freedom against 
economically superior oppressors. 
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